Proving Erasure by Coiteux-Roy, Xavier & Wolf, Stefan
Proving Erasure
Xavier Coiteux-Roy
Faculty of Informatics
Universita` della Svizzera italiana
Lugano, Switzerland
xavier.coiteux.roy@usi.ch
Stefan Wolf
Faculty of Informatics
Universita` della Svizzera italiana
Lugano, Switzerland
stefan.wolf@usi.ch
Abstract—It seems impossible to certify that a remote hosting
service does not leak its users’ data — or does quantum
mechanics make it possible? We investigate if a server hosting
data can information-theoretically prove its definite deletion using
a “BB84-like” protocol. To do so, we first rigorously introduce
an alternative to privacy by encryption: privacy delegation. We
then apply this novel concept to provable deletion and remote
data storage. For both tasks, we present a protocol, sketch its
partial security, and display its vulnerability to eavesdropping
attacks targeting only a few bits.
Index Terms—quantum cryptography, information-theoretic
security, provable deletion, data storage, privacy amplification.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the story goes [1], some sailors who did not have
access to secure private storage on ships would tie their
bag of belongings with the “thief knot.” This particular knot
resembled the reef knot, one of the most common knots, so
that anyone not knowing the secret would tie back the bag
the wrong way. The canny sailors would then detect when
someone went through their belongings because the thief knot
they tied would be altered.
This folktale inspires us to introduce in Section II a novel,
relaxed, notion of privacy: privacy delegation. Privacy dele-
gation does not prevent eavesdropping but it makes such an
act inevitably detectable. It is useful in applications where
we cannot aspire to have perfect encryption in the sense of
Shannon [2].
A typical application is data storage (Section III-A):
Information-theoretically secure encryption of data is impos-
sible unless one keeps a secret key at least as long as the
message that is remotely stored [2], defeating the purpose
of storing it in the first place. So how can a hosting server
meaningfully certify it protected one’s privacy?
This is related to the question of provable erasure (Sec-
tion III-B): Can one verify some information was indeed
deleted? These two tasks seem at first sight impossible, at
least when restricting ourselves to classical physics. We use
quantum theory instead and follow the path of Bennett and
Brassard in 1984 [3]. We present a straightforward protocol
in Section IV and sketch a proof of its partial security in
Section IV-C, before showing in Section IV-D it fails to be
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unconditionally secure against some limited attacks. We are,
in Section IV-E, left with the question of how to fix it.
II. DELEGATING PRIVACY
A. Privacy Delegation: an Alternative Standard for Privacy
The general framework of privacy delegation is the fol-
lowing. After a certain protocol (e.g., data storage), the
prover/server presents a proof to the verifier/user. If the proof
is accepted by the verifier, they are sure the prover respected
their privacy and that none of their data was leaked. On the
other hand, the rejection of the proof by the verifier alarms
them that their data might be compromised. Fig. 1 summarizes
the idea of delegating privacy.
Definition 1. A privacy-delegation protocol is an interactive
protocol between a prover P and a verifier V that aims to
establish whether a message M , sent by V to be temporarily
held by P , was rigorously protected from any past or future
eavesdropper A. V takes as input the message M and the
security parameter n. (V,P,A) are modelled formally as
probabilistic Turing machines.
We will define secure privacy delegation in the language
of modern cryptography [4] through the notion of conditional
indistinguishability: We will say the protocol is secure if, once
the privacy certificate has been produced by the prover P
and accepted by the verifier V , no eavesdropping by an
adversary A can offer any advantage in discriminating whether
the now-completed privacy-delegation protocol was run on one
message, or another, given the two messages are of the same
length.
Definition 2. A privacy-delegation protocol is information-
theoretically secure if and only if, for every prover P and
adversary A,
P
[
CERT(V,P,A)(n)
]
·
(
P
[
DISCR(V,P,A)(n)|CERT(V,P,A)(n)
]
− 1/2
)
< negl(n) , (security)
where n is the security parameter and negl(n) is a negligible
function, meaning smaller than the inverse of any polynomial
function of n for sufficiently large n.
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CERT(V,P,A) is the certification experiment and is passed
(i.e., it evaluates to true) if and only if the verifier V accepts
the privacy certificate produced by the prover P .
DISCR(V,P,A) is the discrimination experiment, and it is
passed if and only if, when attacking the privacy-delegation
protocol executed on either the legitimate message or a dummy
one (with equal probability), the adversary A guesses success-
fully which one it is. While not necessary, it is convenient to
pose P and A as the same entity.
Note that conditioning DISCR(V,P,A) on CERT(V,P,A)
does not imply that the certification experiment is necessarily
done first, as a valid privacy certificate implies eavesdropping
can neither have occurred before, nor can occur after.
Finally, the compact formulation of the privacy-delegation
security definition reflects that the privacy-delegation protocol
is secure as soon as either term is negligible.
Note how, in presence of a prover generating a valid privacy
certificate with probability 1, the above definition of secure
privacy delegation reduces to Shannon’s notion of information-
theoretic security against eavesdropping. Any scheme which
is perfectly secure in Shannon’s sense can be seen as a trivial
privacy-delegation scheme for which all certificates are valid.
(a) A valid privacy certificate guarantees that no leaks about the
sensitive message occured.
(b) It is arbritrarily unlikely to produce a valid privacy certificate if
eavesdropping has occured.
Fig. 1: Privacy delegation is a novel approach to privacy.
We conclude our definition of privacy delegation by re-
quiring one additional property: It is desirable that a privacy-
delegation protocol fails with non-negligible probability only
when the prover is dishonest.
Definition 3. A privacy-delegation protocol is correct if and
only if there exists a prover Phonest such that
P
[
CERT(V,Phonest,A)(n)
]
> 1− negl(n) . (correctness)
B. Privacy Delegation Is an Alarm Bell
We shall stress the role of privacy delegation to detect
information leaks; it is not by itself an encryption method:
It offers no security against a malicious prover other than
announcing its behaviour. In this sense, privacy delegation is
more an alarm bell than a lock.
It can be useful in bringing a concept of liability to a hosting
server. When a server leaks its users’ data, whether by malice
or negligence, its privacy certificate will be rejected, and the
server can subsequently be boycotted or taken to court.
Note that privacy delegation is different from digital wa-
termarking [5], even if both techniques can be used to detect
leaking agents. Digital watermarking mixes the sensitive data
with hidden identification information in a way the source
of the leak can be identified once the leaked data surfaces,
while privacy delegation enables to detect misbehaviour even
if no abnormal traces of the sensitive information have been
observed. Privacy delegation offers in that sense stronger pro-
tection, even if neither approach directly prevents the leakage
of data.
III. APPLICATIONS
A. Remote Storage
An important application of privacy delegation is the
remote storage of classical information. In this setting, a user
wants to upload classical data to a server and be able to
retrieve it later; while the server wants to prove to the user
it protected its data from any eavesdropping — both in the
past and in the future. We explicit the general form of this task.
The task of remote storage with privacy delegation:
1) A user (verifier V) wants to store the classical message M
on a server (prover P). The user can manipulate quantum
states.
2) V generates a key k at random and sends quantum
encoding ρ(M,k) to P . The state ρ(M,k) depends on
the specific protocol.
3) Time passes. Eventually the user V asks the server P for
its data ρ(M,k) back and wants to be assured no copies
were made.
4) P sends back a quantum state ρ′ which will also act as
the privacy certificate. If they are honest, ρ′ = ρ(M,k).
5) V examines the privacy certificate (i.e., ρ′). If they
accept it and the protocol is secure, neither P nor any
eavesdropper A have any information about M .
Note that the last step is not a full authentication of the
quantum state ρ(M,k) but only of its privacy-delegation
layer1. It is, however, easy to guarantee the integrity of the
classical data by adding on top of the privacy-delegation
protocol a Wegman-Carter classical authentication scheme [7].
These schemes are well-known and can be information-
theoretically secure even with a short key.
Because of the nature of remote storage with privacy, it is
clear that if the user must keep a secret key: It must at least
be shorter than the message to be stored. This is impossible if
we aim for arbitrarily perfect secrecy, as stated by Shannon’s
theorem, and it is why we look for privacy delegation instead
of encryption.
Privacy delegation differs from, but is not incompatible with
(as we develop next), the standard approach which is to aim
for computational security. Computational security is reached
through classical encryption relying on assumptions on the
computing power of the adversary and the hardness of certain
mathematical problems [8], [9].
B. Provable Deletion
Provable deletion can be framed as a general case of remote
storage. In this scenario, the user/verifier is not interested in
retrieving their remotely stored data, but simply orders for its
definitive erasure. The server/prover subsequently produces a
token which, if accepted by the user, certifies the erasure. It is
of special interest because classically, there is no way for the
server to prove it did not secretly keep a backup of the data,
as the act of copying classical information is undetectable.
The task of provable deletion with privacy delegation:
1) A user (verifier V) wants to store the classical message M
on a server (prover P). The user can manipulate quantum
states.
2) V generates a key k at random and sends quantum
encoding ρ(M,k) to P . The state ρ(M,k) depends on
the specific protocol.
3) Time passes. Eventually the user V asks the server P to
provably delete all of its data M .
4) P applies some operations on ρ(M,k) and provides to V
a privacy certificate C.
5) V examines C, whose acceptance proves the erasure
of M .
We note here that we are analyzing the provable deletion of
purely classical information. The no-go theorem for deleting
arbitrary quantum states [10] does, therefore, not apply.
1We were made aware after finishing this work of Daniel Gottesman’s
concept of uncloneable encryption, and of its conjecture that it could be ap-
plicable to schemes that were different from quantum authentication schemes
in that they would “not authenticate the classical message” [6]. Since our
privacy-delegation scheme does no error estimation in the rectilinear basis, our
work is coincidentally relevant to that interrogation. We do not directly study
the impact of revealing the user’s key at the end of the privacy-delegation
protocols, but it would be a very relevant question for this framework—it
would make erasure even more meaningful.
C. Combining Privacy Delegation and Computational Secu-
rity
In cases where standard privacy is desirable, meaning when
privacy concerns require more than leak detection, privacy
delegation can be complemented by classical encryption with
computational security. Such a combination has multiple ad-
vantages. First, the storage is still meaningful as both tech-
niques only necessitate short keys. Second, it makes possible
the concept of recalling encrypted data. Standard classical
encryption relies on assumptions that need not hold forever:
Computing power grows exponentially, and the underlying
hard mathematical problems could at any time be solved
more easily than currently believed. There is no guarantee of
everlasting security with standard classical encryption because
any encrypted message can be stored by an adversary until its
encryption becomes obsolete [11]. As such, there is always
a risk, even if one uses strong up-to-date encryption, in
uploading data to a server that could leak it. If, however, the
server is able to produce a valid privacy certificate when the
user wants to recall data to change its encryption, then the
user can be sure that her or his data is still perfectly safe.
Finally, an adversary scanning massive amounts of data
looking for weak encryptions, obsolete standards and/or valu-
able information can be quickly detected by the privacy-
delegation scheme. This makes the hosting network more
secure as a whole, since an adversary will not necessarily
know what type of computational encryption they are attacking
before they attack it in a detectable way.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION: A NAIVE PROTOCOL
We explore how to implement privacy delegation in the
information-theoretically secure way of Section II. We start
with a naive protocol which splits into two versions: remote
storage (STORAGE) and provable deletion (ERASURE).
We then show how they are partially secure whereas an
eavesdropper can still gain some small amount of information
even when privacy should be certified.
A. The Encoding
Both versions start the same way. The idea is for the user
to pree¨mptively, at random positions, sprinkle the m bits plain
message in the rectilinear basis {|0〉 , |1〉} with n random “trap
bits” in the diagonal basis {|+〉 , |−〉}. Fig. 2 illustrates the
idea.
The secret key k, used later by the user to validate the
privacy certificate provided by the server, then consists of the
n random check bits s0, s1, . . . , sn and their positions. The
length of the secret key is, therefore (with the approximation
valid when m n),
len(k) = n+ log
(
m+ n
n
)
≈ n logm. (1)
Note that the encoded message is not, and needs not be,
securely encrypted in the traditional sense: An adversary can
read almost all of it without requiring the secret key. However,
when it does so, it destroys the information needed to conclude
Fig. 2: The message is in the rectilinear basis and is interceded
with bits in the diagonal basis whose ulterior integrity certifies
the privacy of the then-recovered (or then-erased) message.
successfully the privacy delegation: The eavesdropping can be
detected2. The security parameter n constrains the minimal
length m of the message meaningfully stored (m n), but it
is quite natural to assume the message is long in the storage
setting.
B. The Privacy Delegation
The protocol now splits into two versions according to the
chosen task.
a) Remote-Storage Version: In the version STORAGE,
the server sends back the whole quantum state to the user, who
then checks the integrity of the sprinkled bits and separate
them from the meaningful data. If the user’s measurements
on the sprinkled bits match their secret key, they accept the
privacy certificate. Otherwise, they reject it and accuse the
server of having leaked their information.
Note that the integrity of the information stored on the server
is not guaranteed by that basic protocol even when the privacy
delegation succeeds because an adversary could for example
flip in the rectilinear basis (i.e., apply an X-gate) every bit
without making CERT fail. As mentioned before we are,
however, not concerned by this kind of attack because it can
be prevented in a straightforward way using a Wegman-Carter
classical authentication scheme.
b) Provable-Deletion Version: In the version
ERASURE, the user asks the server to delete all of its
data by measuring it in the diagonal basis and publicly
announcing the result. If the server behaved honestly and did
not leak any data, the output should be completely random
except for the sprinkled check bits. The user accepts the
privacy certificate if these values correspond to the secret key,
and reject it otherwise. They ignore all non-sprinkled bits.
The proof of erasure comes from the server being forced
to measure in the diagonal basis bits that are encoded in the
rectilinear basis. This gives a series of uniformly random bits
while destroying the original information. Since the diagonal-
basis measurements are announced publicly by the prover, they
cannot rewind the protocol later: The information which was
encoded in the rectilinear basis is lost forever.
2This is different from quantum sealing [12], because we require here that
the secret key be shorter than the message and do not insist on the message
being totally readable by someone not having the key.
C. Partial Security
Both versions of the naive protocol offer arbitrarily high par-
tial privacy-delegation security for sufficiently long messages,
meaning that a valid certificate information-theoretically guar-
antees that at most a limited fraction of the total information
was leaked. We aim to give the intuition behind this statement
by proving it for non-coherent attacks. We show the privacy
certificate will be rejected with arbitrarily high probability in
presence of enough eavesdropping.
Theorem 1. For both STORAGE and ERASURE, the prob-
ability of any prover P producing a valid privacy certificate
in presence of an eavesdropper A˜(r) doing a rectilinear
projective measurement on r ∈ Θ(m) qubits is given by
P
[
CERT(V,P,A˜(r))
]
≤ 2−rn/(m+n)+ + 2 exp(−22r) , (2)
where m is the message length, n the number of sprinkled
check bits, and  some fixed constant.
Proof. The probability to pass the certification given the
number K = k of randomly sprinkled check bits that were
measured by the eavesdropper is 2−k. K follows a hyper-
geometric distribution (it is as if the eavesdropper had done
classical sampling). The maximal probability of passing the
certification is thus
P
[
CERT(V,P,A˜(r))
]
=
r∑
k=0
2−k
(
n
k
)(
m
r−k
)(
m+n
r
) . (3)
The upper bound follows from Hoeffding’s inequality [13],
[14],
P [|K − µ(K)| ≥ ] ≤ 2 exp(−22r) , (4)
with µ(K) = rn/(m+ n) since K is hypergeometric.
D. An Attack Leaking Partial Information
An attack on a limited number of bits is, however, still
possible. More precisely, an adversary can pass with non-
negligible probability both a discrimination experiment (e.g.,
discriminating a message starting by 0 from an uniformly
random one) and the certification experiment.
Theorem 2. STORAGE and ERASURE are insecure
against an eavesdropper A¯ measuring only, in the rectilinear
basis, the first bit of the quantumly encoded message (of length
m) and a prover P¯ proceeding honestly otherwise.
Proof.
P
[
DISCR(V,P¯,A¯)(n)|CERT(V,P¯,A¯)(n)
]
− 1/2
≥ (1− n/(n+m))/4 ,
P
[
CERT(V,P¯,A¯)(n)
]
= 1− n/(2(n+m)) ,
∴P
[
CERT(V,P¯,A¯)(n)
]
·
(
P
[
DISCR(V,P¯,A¯)(n)|CERT(V,P¯,A¯)(n)
]
− 1/2
)
6< negl(n) .
This does not mean that the protocol is useless, as it is
already desirable to restrict the amount of stored data that
can be leaked without the user becoming aware. This is espe-
cially so if the data are already encrypted with computational
security. However, for our protocol to be more than only
partially secure, the protocol run on any message should be
indistinguishable from the one run on any other one. It is
important to note the weakness exhibited in Thm. 2 is also
present in naive implementations of BB84. We will discuss
next how this problem is, however, usually resolved in the
case of BB84, and what this implies for our privacy-delegation
protocol.
E. Privacy Amplification by Public Discussion
In its original version [3], the BB84 quantum key-
distribution protocol was also susceptible to the weak attack
suggested in Proposition 2. There was, however, a fix: privacy
amplification by public discussion [15]–[17]. These now well-
known schemes aim to reduce the amount of information an
eavesdropper can have about the private key. Two parties do so
by assessing through public discussion how much information
the eavesdropper can have about their key and by agreeing
accordingly on a randomly selected error-correcting code or
a hashing function from a universal class. When successful
(if Eve does not have too much information), the result is a
shorter but fully private key. Public discussion between Alice
and Bob is achieved through a perfectly authenticated, but not
private, channel.
In our storage scenario, public discussion is unavailable
as it would necessitate communication between a user’s past
and future selves. Communication from the past to the future
could still be simulated by the user if they keep some secret
information, but the amount of this information they would
need to privately store to apply standard privacy-amplification
schemes would be longer than the message they want to store.
Privacy amplification by public discussion as it is usually done
fails, therefore, to extend partial privacy-delegation security
to full information-theoretic privacy-delegation security in the
storage setting. Could there be an alternative way in this setting
to amplify the partial security? And how close to information-
theoretic security can we get in presence of more sophisticated
adversaries?3 These are our main open questions.
V. CONCLUSION
We approached this work with one question in mind: Does
quantum mechanics make provable deletion of classical data
achievable? This leads us to define rigorously privacy delega-
tion, an alternative to the ideal of privacy through encryption,
and to formalize how to detect leaks during data storage.
We suggest that quantum-provable deletion could be possi-
ble by providing a naive privacy-delegation scheme for both
3Indistinguishability seems for example to be too strong of a security
requirement if the adversary can build coherent attacks using unlimited
computational power. That is because the short-key requirement implies that∑
k∈K ρ(M,k)/|K| cannot be uniform over all messages.
the remote-storage and provable-deletion problems. The ques-
tion remains, however, open as our scheme offers only partial
security: It fails against restricted attacks on targeted bits.
This shortcoming is known from quantum key distribution;
unfortunately, the fix used there, namely privacy amplification
by public discussion, cannot be applied in our setting.
To conclude, we emphasize that even if the protocols
presented are out of reach of current quantum technologies —
quantum memory is hard —, there is real value in devising and
analyzing this kind of theoretical puzzles: Formal definitions
give focus and direction to future research, while attempts
to solve difficult problems under novel constraints invariably
spark new ideas that ultimately turn into the building blocks
needed to shrink the domain of the mathematical, cryptological
and physical impossibles.
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